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The Presence of the Federal System in Mexico
Josg Gamas-Torruco'
I. BACKGROUND
Colonial Mexico was ruled by a strongly centralized political or-
ganization. All the powers were issued from the Crown in Spain.
A Viceroy-Audiencia system concentrated and exercised the dele-
gated authority. The King was lawmaker, enforcer, and judge.
The Audiencia had limited powers to provide local legal measures,
performed as a Supreme Tribunal and as surveyor of the execu-
tive. The Viceroy was the representative of the Crown, chief
commander of the army, and head of the administration; he ap-
pointed the colonial officers and the governors of the provinces, by
custom all natives of Spain, and intervened in provincial and mu-
nicipal matters. No local legislative bodies were ever accepted.
The laws made in Spain were frequently far from local require-
ments and demands. The flaws of such a system were pointed out
at the end of colonial times when the revolution against the Napo-
leonic invasion in Spain and the captivity of the royal family lead
to the liberal Constitution of Cadix. This supreme law created
provincial assemblies, each assembly having the power to perform
limited administrative tasks within its provincial borders, as a
response to a general claim of the American colonies. The Consti-
tution, however, was only temporarily in force, as it was rejected
with the return of absolutism with the return of Ferdinand the VII
to the throne of Spain in 1914. The liberal military movement
which restored the Constitution in 1920 practically coincided with
Mexico's independence. Thus, self-government was unknown in
Mexico during the three centuries of Spanish domination.
As soon as Mexican independence was achieved, the autocratic
tendencies inherited by the dominant economic interests began to
shape the government. The provinces rebelled against this at-
tempt and demanded a constitutional convention and the founding
of a federal state. The model was the United States Constitution.
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Thus, federalism was adopted in the Mexican Constitution of
1824. The former provinces were given the status of states.
From that date on, politics were overwhelmed by the cleavage of
society: "conservatives," looking forward to preserving the privi-
leges of the colonial times (mostly land and mine owners), the
army (whose officers came from the former Spanish colonial
army), and the Catholic Church (with strong participation in gov-
ernment, control of the education and social systems and with
immense land property) on one side; "liberals," representing an
emerging middle class trying to create a modern state, taking
France and the United States as paragons, on the other. No con-
solidation of any kind could be achieved in those years of alterna-
tive and short victories from each side. The final triumph of the
liberals culminated in the Constitution of 1857: the separation of
church and state was achieved, and again, the Mexican federation
was structured according to the United States' scheme with the
adaptations that were deemed necessary.
Against the liberal victory, the Catholic Church and the conser-
vatives declared a civil war which lasted for three years. At the
liberal triumph, a French invasion ensued, establishing an empire
with a European prince at its head. The resistance and later on,
the offensive of the liberals - lead by President Benito Judrez -
now organized in a popular army achieved a "second independ-
ence." The Constitution of 1857 was restored in 1867.
In the capital, Mexico City, the government was conducted by
Presidents Judrez and Lerdo with strict democratic practices, re-
spect for human rights, and obedience to the rule of law. The
"juicio de amparo," as a writ of protection of human rights, was
developed. But the states were now dominated by strong military
"caudillos," the former leaders in the past wars - now popular
heroes. Continued unrest forced the government to declare states
of emergency one after another according to the procedures estab-
lished in the Constitution.
One of the local warlords, Porfirio Diaz, organized an effective
revolt and overthrew the legitimate government of Lerdo, inaugu-
rating a dictatorship which lasted thirty years. Diaz preserved
formally the Constitution but organized behind it a personal
power structure.
The federal system was only nominal. The states were viewed
as potentially dangerous strongholds of military forces menacing
the central government. The decisions were progressively central-
ized. Diaz favored big landowners, and the extreme protection
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granted to investors and against labor provoked popular unrest,
especially in the countryside and in mining industrial areas.
A democratic popular and social revolution started in 1910 and
achieved its normative expression in the "Political Constitution of
the United Mexican States," in force since 1917. It is still the su-
preme law in Mexico. For the first time, social and economic
rights were recognized in the text of a Constitution. The federal
state was again structured.
II. "THE SYSTEM" (PRESIDENT - PARTY)
After the revolution, the powers were organized according to the
Constitution and the rule of law prevailed uneasily among the
struggle between revolutionary leaders. The first governments
were based in military power. The menace was, again, coming
from the warlords entrenched in the states. The only possible
point of agreement was the necessity to accomplish the promises
made during the revolution, now constitutional provisions and
strong popular claims: agrarian reform, labor protective legisla-
tion, and economic nationalism.
In 1929, as a result of the murder of the elected president, the
animosity between the military rulers was aggravated. Mexico
was menaced by another civil war. The state "caudillos" were
called by Plutarco Elias Calles, ex-president and the strongest po-
litical personality in Mexico, to reach a pact rejecting militarism
and violent solutions. A party was created in order to institution-
alize political life, organize elections, arbitrate the different inter-
ests, and decide the allocation of power quotas. The party was
carefully organized at national, state, and local levels, and it care-
fully and progressively co-opted labor and country organizations.
It adopted different denominations from 1929 forward: National
Revolutionary Party, Party of the Mexican Revolution, and today's
Revolutionary-Institutional Party ("PRI"). Under its different
names, the Party dominated Mexican political life until the elec-
tions of July 2000.
Controlled at first by Calles, the Party recognized the incum-
bent President as its only and unquestionable leader from 1938
on. The absolute prohibition of reelection was established and
accomplished. The Party's organization and inclusion of workers
and peasants permitted the progressive elimination of the army
from political life. The army became a strong and loyal arm of the
political system. In Mexico, Latin American style militarism was
unknown in the twentieth century.
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The Party controlled the elections at national, state, and local
levels. Vicious electoral practices were common but sometimes
unnecessary because the political system was acquiring more and
more legitimacy. The economic and social progress for more than
three decades and the openness of politics to different levels of
society were definite factors.
The evolution of federalism should be explained within the
process of structure and consolidation of the new political system.
First, it was necessary to diminish the power and influence of the
local lords to, elementary, have peace. Then the new state vision
required institutions and organizations at national level. (For ex-
ample, the government created a financial system, started the
construction of roads, and commenced an ambitious and successful
irrigation program). The requirements of economic development
practically forced centralized measures.
The continuous growth of central authority invalidated the fed-
eral structure. The President was not only the chief executive and
the head of a growing administrative machine but also the leader
of a dominant political party; he decided upon the candidates for
state governors and representatives and senators to Congress.
Since the 1970's, the system lost legitimacy due to economic crises
(the insufficiency of the economic system to give satisfaction to an
increased population) and social plurality (the spectacular growth
of a middle class that has presented demands that could not no
longer being satisfied). The opposition forces grew and attained
political positions that were accepted and, in some cases, fore-
shadowed by a series of constitutional reforms.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
It is not my purpose to repeat the normativity of the federal
structure for the sake of it, but to distinguish within this structure
the institutions that could give Mexican federalism a peculiar
character.
The Constitution clearly distinguishes the federal and state
powers. The classic principle prevails that the powers not explic-
itly delegated by the Constitution to the federal officers are re-
served to the states. This principle has been respected and strictly
enforced by Mexican courts.
Notwithstanding, the Constitution limits the autonomy of the
states more than other federal constitutions, imposing uniformity
and limits on the state political organization, even the rules of
composition and structure of their legislative, executive, and even
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judicial powers. State constitutional freedom is thus limited be-
cause the respective constitutional conventions and reform powers
are bound by such rules.
The allocation of powers favors the central government. The
central (federal) powers are enormous in comparison to those of
the states. They were substantial in the original text of the Con-
stitution and have been increased through a series of constitu-
tional reforms. In fact, Article 73 of the Constitution, which pro-
vides the congressional powers, is the provision that has received
the most amendments, always to increase the scope of the central
legislature.
The state constitutions are limited in regard to municipal gov-
ernments. The Constitution grants them a good deal of autonomy
due to the fact that in the past they have been limited, particu-
larly in allocation of resources. Express powers and allocation of
resources are thus given.
In the Mexican system we recognize four legal orders, forming
four levels of government: central or federal, state, municipal, and
the Federal District. Originally shaped in the model of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the Federal Districts' status began to change in
1983 when a series of constitutional reforms made Mexico City a
"near - state," with local elected authorities and local legislative
and governmental power.
The nature of powers in the Mexican system is as follows.
Express powers are those explicitly granted to the national, cen-
tral, or federal government by the Constitution. Congress has the
implied power to make all laws which shall be necessary for carry-
ing into execution the express powers and any other vested in the
national government. This clause is almost identical to that of the
United States Constitution. This clause has not been used be-
cause the process of the constitutional reforms has been very easy
until 2000 in an atmosphere of weak state power.
The Mexican Constitution specifically qualifies as concurrent
powers those powers that, in certain exclusive and limited areas,
Congress can allocate by law, part to the central level and part to
the state and even municipal levels. It is an obvious exception to
the constitutional principle that allocation of powers can be made
exclusively by the Constitution, which means by constitutional
reform. Mexico has never recognized the principle that powers
allocated to the central government but not exercised by Congress
can, in the meantime, be used by the states.
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Coincident powers are those shared by national and state legis-
latures, one such example being the power to tax. Reserved pow-
ers are powers left to the state by exclusion. There also exist pow-
ers specifically granted to the states and powers prohibited to one
or both levels of government.
The Constitution provides the protection of the system of alloca-
tion of powers by the classical means. Structurally, the Senate is
a chamber representing and defending the states within Federal
Congress. Furthermore, the reform of the Constitution requires
not only a three-quarters majority in Congress but also the favor-
able vote of the majority of state legislatures.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FEDERALISM
The Mexican Constitution contains a very complete system of
control of constitutionality: on human rights, on the respect for the
allocation of powers among central, state, and local authorities,
and on electoral rules and practices.
Regarding the allocation of powers:
The Juicio de Amparo is a writ that provides that any person
who suffers from a law, judicial sentence, administrative act, or
any conduct from an officer in which human rights are violated or
the federal or state law is unduly issued or applied because it in-
vades the competence which the Constitution grants to state or
federal, can demand before federal judges or federal courts (in case
of sentences) and obtain protection (Amparo). If the violation can
be proved, the amparo is granted. The resolution of the federal
judges and courts can be revised in those cases by the Supreme
Court of Justice. If the amparo is finally favorable, the sentence
or acts are declared void. In the case of laws, the individual is ex-
cluded from its application, but the law remains in force.
Any power can challenge another power for "invasion of compe-
tence," constitutional controversies of this sort being reserved to
the Supreme Court of Justice. These controversies can originate
between: federal powers with a state power or Federal District
authorities; federal powers and a municipality; a federal power
and another federal power; a state power and another state power;
a state power and Federal District authorities; a Federal District
authority and a municipality; two municipalities of the same
state; one State and one of its municipalities; one state and mu-
nicipalities of another state; and a Federal District authority and
one muncipality.
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The power affected can initiate the procedures. In the case of
administrative acts, if they "invade" a zone of competences, they
are declared void. In the case of law, if the unconstitutionality is
approved by the vote of eight of the eleven superior judges, the law
in question is repealed.
The Supreme Court of Justice resolves the conflicts of jurisdic-
tion between courts; federal and state; federal and Federal Dis-
trict; one state and another; one state and Federal District. It also
resolves conflicts within Federal Courts.
V. FEDERAL DISTRICT
The Federal District has been considered in the three federal
Constitutions of Mexico, each of which recognized the philosophy
of the District's territorial independence of federal power from any
other power. The American experiences in this matter and the
way the District of Columbia was shaped were well-known. It was
clear that grave problems could be avoided if the territorial free-
dom of the federal powers were granted.
The Federal District in Mexico was settled in Mexico City, the
proud capital of the Aztecs and the core of New Spain. The city, at
the time of the first Mexican Constitution, had been the center of
two great civilizations, the native and the European, and was five
hundred years old.
Mexico City is today one of the biggest human concentrations in
the world. It is the financial, political, cultural, social, and reli-
gious center of Mexico and has been so for centuries; history and
tradition have given Mexico City an original dimension unlike
other federal capitals such as Brasilia (moved from Rio de Ja-
neiro), Ottawa, Washington, or Canberra.
The first years of the Constitution of 1824 confirmed as wise the
decision to exclude any other power from the Federal District.
This was in view of the clash between the new national powers
and those of the neighboring state that claimed the new capital as
part of its territory and reluctantly gave way to the new political
organization.
Since 1824, the lawmaking power in the Federal District was
the Congress, and the executive was granted to the President.
Both powers acted as federal as well as local authorities for the
Federal District. The legislation for Federal District was carefully
elaborated as different from the federal one. The "reserved" pow-
ers were thus granted to Congress and the President; the judiciary
was appointed by those two. The local administration was vested
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into a "Governor" or "Chief of Government" appointed by the
President as his delegate. At first there were municipalities, but
later they were substituted by "delegaciones" and the "mayors"
appointed by the Federal District local chief or governor.
As a consequence of the astonishing growth of Mexico City,
there was a surge of political activism. As part of this political
activist movement, the Federal District claimed the right of elect-
ing local authorities, which the text of the Constitution denied.
The activists highlighted the particular knowledge, time, and spe-
cialization needed to handle the challenges presented by the con-
tinuously growing metropolitan area - the multiplication of ser-
vices, the emergence of a complex urban culture and related sub-
cultures, the complexity of new problems arising from growth, and
the necessary coordination with the authorities of neighboring
states invaded by the ever-expanding metropolitan area. On the
other hand, the administration was present in the everyday life of
Federal District, and citizens resented being ruled by authorities
coming from elsewhere - even if they were the federal officials. A
series of constitutional amendments created a local Assembly and
later on, a local government issued from local elections.
Today constitutional regulation of the Federal District is as fol-
lows. The frame of the political structure - the proper Constitu-
tion of the Federal District - are given in the Constitution of the
United Mexican States. The details come from a "statute" of Con-
gress that has the quality of an organic law. The lawmaking proc-
ess is largely vested in one local Assembly, with reserved powers
in Congress. The powers of the local Assembly are almost identi-
cal of those of the states.
The executive power is vested in a "Chief of Government," ac-
cording to the presidential philosophy, independent of the Assem-
bly but with powers of initiative and veto. The "delegaciones" in
which the city is divided are politically independent of the "chief"
but coordinated in administrative matters. The Assembly, the
Chief of Government, and the chiefs of each delegation are elected
directly, as are the rest of the Mexican representatives and execu-
tives.
VI. THE POLITICAL CHANGES
The best years of the President Party system were from 1940 to
1970 - three decades of continuous economic growth (almost six
percent yearly average). The "unwritten rules" were essential to
its performance. The constitutional principle of no reelection after
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each six-year term of the Presidency was strictly respected. Each
President assumed all the powers concerning the chiefdom of the
Party which became omnipotent winning local, state, and local
elections. This was the equivalent of complete centralization.
Each President appointed the "candidate" headed to win the next
election. The incumbent would retire and the new assumed all the
constitutional and "metaconstitutional" powers. They were enor-
mous. It was the President's privilege to appoint candidates to
governorships and to seats in both chambers of the federal Con-
gress. Their electoral victory was certain.
The Party created a formidable national machinery and con-
trolled all the elections, national, state and local. It also pro-
moted, created, and assimilated peasant workers and professional
organizations. The national structure was organized along those
lines. It also maintained a revolutionary ideology as a means of
indoctrination even if the government was very pragmatic. The
Party within was a forum of negotiation, arbitration, and alloca-
tion of power quotas.
The Party opened its ranks to the growing middle class. The
"no reelection" rule - applied also to governors and, in a limited
way, to representatives and senators - permitted a dynamic
renovation of the political class and constant relations with all
social strata. The system was based mostly in legitimacy and
openness rather than coercion, which was used in a limited way.
The killing of students in Tlatelolco before the 1968 Olympic
Games horrified the country and tragically excluded the authori-
tarian solutions.
Elections were held regularly and electoral campaigns helped to
receive demands, negotiate them, and revive contact with all so-
cial strata. Most of the popular leaders were co-opted into the
Party.
In 1939, the main opposition party, the National Action Party
(PAN), was founded and persistently fought for clean elections and
democratic rules. From then on, the legitimacy of the system as a
whole was never discussed, even if some of its practices were con-
demned.
PRI was proclaimed to be "revolutionary." It elaborated a na-
tionalist and welfare state ideology. But it was also very prag-
matic in this matter and proposed the programs that circum-
stances required. PRI proclaimed social justice, but it was dis-
cretely anti-communist. Even if the political dialogue was some-
times very strong against the greed and abuses of capitalism, PRI
Duquesne Law Review
favored private enterprise. The favorable continuous economic
growth and the attention given to social programs account for dif-
ferent grades of a widespread acceptance.
The elections were controlled by government institutions with
the increased participation of opposition parties.
The growth of population and the exhaustion of the economic
model caused a series of economic crises that frustrated and upset
particularly old and new urban areas. The opposition parties, par-
ticularly PAN, took advantage of the situation.
A series of political reforms ensued, first in 1963 and 1972, and
then in 1977, 1983, 1990, 1993, and 1996. The continuity of the
reforms is remarkable: some were made when the inevitability of
more political demands were foreseen; more reforms were later
agreed upon as soon as opposition parties gained force. The re-
forms permitted a political transition to a democratic system.
They were several: electoral system combining majority with pro-
portional representation; opening Congress to opposition parties;
empowering Congress; more judicial limits to executive and legis-
lative authorities; control of elections by an independent organiza-
tion with representation of all political parties and representatives
of the civil society; creation of an electoral jurisdiction; govern-
mental finance of political parties and regulation of its practices;
new status for the Federal District; and powers to the Supreme
Court of Justice to resolve conflicts between executive and legisla-
tive, federal and state powers and Federal District authorities.
The quantum of representatives and senators of opposition par-
ties grew. In 1989 the first opposition state governor was elected,
and in 2000, the constitutional system allowed the cleanest and
most uncontested election ever in Mexico. The opposition party
PAN won the Presidency; the PRI remained the principal political
force in the Chamber of Representatives (but not a majority) and
retained the majority in the Senate; the organizations of the left,
grouped in PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution), shaped
upon a schism from the left wing of PRI (which later melted the
leftist groups.) PDR emerged as a third political force and ob-
tained an overwhelming victory in Mexico City's Assembly and
government.
The intermediate elections for congressmen and Federal District
deputies to the local Assembly in 2003 maintained this composi-
tion of political forces stable except for an unprecedented victory of
PRD in Mexico City. In this context, the position of the states has
been changed. Mexico has thirty-one states plus the Federal Dis-
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trict. Today, eleven state governments and the Federal District's
government are PRD, PAN, or "independent coalitions" with mi-
nor parties. PRI preserves twenty-one state governments. It is
now common to have alternate governments in the states; in two
cases, PRI "regained" the governorship in the next election.
The following results, after more than a decade, can be ob-
served. In almost all the states the political competition is well-
received and its performance has been satisfactory, without any
interruption in economic or social life. The profile of local candi-
dates is definitely aimed toward people with residence, and politi-
cal standing on the state and elections are fought and decided on
local issues. In a few states there is a clear tendency to form
groups and even family feuds. The three main political parties are
against those practices. In a few states the tendency towards one
dominant party within is clear, but in general, the next electoral
result is difficult to foresee and competition seems to be working.
It is common that the governor has a strong opposition in the local
Congress because his party is not in the majority. That has pro-
voked budget deadlocks in three states. In one state, two succes-
sive governors have been impeached. One of them was forced to
resign. The rest has been working satisfactorily. In two states the
elections have been contested; there are still electoral vices and
reluctance to accept the victory of rivals. The Federal District's
Chief of Government is in permanent confrontation with the
President, and the Assembly with the Federal Congress.
VII. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF GOVERNORS
At the beginning of the new era of a democratic elected national
government in December 2000, Mexico suffered natural unbal-
ances, which emerged from a change of the political system and
the search for a new equilibrium of forces.
The first trend was a rearrangement of the political parties.
The governors affiliated with PRI and PRD organized exclusive
meetings of comrade members to discuss matters of common in-
terest, sometimes "inviting" those "interested neighbors" from dif-
ferent affiliations. At the beginning the PAN governors were ab-
sent. Being that their party was in national command, they ex-
pressed serious reservations that the grouping of governors could
hide an underground political movement against the federal gov-
ernment.
On July 13, 2002, the Declaration of Cancfin was issued by the
governors of PRI-PRD, forming the National Conference of Gover-
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nors (CONAGO) as "a free and open arena to analyze the problems
of the states in order to find common solutions, with view to inte-
grate them in the national government's public policies, always in
coordination with federal officers." The governors affiliated with
PAN did not assist. Later, when the idea of cooperative federal-
ism was matured and assurances were given that there were not
political, but institutional purposes, PAN governors finally de-
cided to join.
CONAGO was established with the thirty-one governors and the
Chief of the Federal District as an informal group due to the pro-
hibition contained in the Constitution of the states to create
agreements between them. Thus, there is not any "statute act" or
any other constitutional document - just the verbal manifesta-
tion of will and the commitment before the nation to work to-
gether. All agreements should be accepted by unanimity, free
from party positions and without any pressure from the majority
upon the minority.
To date, fifteen meetings have been held, the purpose being to
continue holding them in each one of the state capitals by rotation.
The host governor acts as the "moderator" of the meeting. The
governors do not give press interviews, but following the meetings,
a short and concise general statement is released, exclusively con-
taining the agreements obtained by unanimity.
As soon as the meetings proved successful, it was necessary to
establish groups to work on the different subjects agreed upon, the
preparation of the subsequent meetings, and to elaborate and pre-
serve documents. The groups were ordered into a General Secre-
tariat. No formal rules exist to regulate organization, structure,
or procedures. The groups are working on the following subjects:
migration; rural problems; poverty eradication; education; coop-
eration in case of natural disasters; tax and finance; budget, in-
come, and expenses; surveyance of federal tax participations; in-
frastructure; federal and state jurisdictions in official certifica-
tions; health; reform of the state; public security; time allocation
in radio and television; municipal problems; and social groups and
media. The subjects imply a full revision of state activity and re-
lations with the federal government.
The groups are coordinated by one of the state representatives
and include the states interested in participating. A series of pro-
posals of action, legal adjustments on the state and federal levels,
and possible agreements are emerging.
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To date, the main results of CONAGO have been as follows.
First, the establishment of the Conference itself, the successful
fifteen meeting series, and the National Treasury Convention can
prove that CONAGO has been well-conceived and well-directed. It
has been accepted by the federal government and has a high
standing in the public opinion. The acceptance of CONAGO by the
federal government as a forum in the "Declaration of Cuatro Ci6-
negas," with the signature of the President, gives the Conference
moral value and clearly expresses the commitment of both levels
of government to enhance the principles of the federal state, ar-
range the financial problems, and revise the "concurrent powers"
in order to achieve an effective decentralization and any other
constitutional provision necessary to establish new state responsi-
bilities and equilibria between the two orders. (The signature of
the pact in Cuatro Cignegas was symbolic: All parties and all ex-
ecutives assisted in that village in which originated the revolu-
tionary movement that culminated in the Constitution of 1917.)
Finally, the first National Treasury Convention was called to start
the complete revision of the Mexican tax system. The result was
satisfactory, though no concrete results are yet in view. Being the
immediate problem on the agenda, we have reserved a special
treatment for the subject.
VIII. TAX MATTERS
Like many federal constitutions, that of Mexico establishes con-
current tax powers. The distribution of taxes is as follows.
The federal government has the exclusive right to tax foreign
trade, exploitation of oil and minerals, financial and insurance
institutions, public federal services, electricity, tobacco, gasoline,
matches, "aguamiel" (alcoholic beverage from cactus plant), forest
exploitation and production, and consumption of beer. The Fed-
eration by constitutional prevention should share these special
taxes in the amount determined by federal law with the states.
There are taxes specifically proper of the municipalities: income
issuing from its own patrimony, real estate property, local public
services, and direct federal "participations" granted to the munici-
palities. Thus, the rest of the taxation is an area in which the
Federation and states have equal power to make laws.
This situation has caused, since the beginning, inequality of
taxes and revenues and "competition" between Federation and
states to tax and collect, thus "squeezing" the taxpayer. The prob-
lems had to be solved by agreements between Federation and
Duquesne Law Review
states. After three National Tax Conventions (in 1925, 1932, and
1947), a National Tax Coordination System regulated by federal
law was created. The National Tax Conventions were dominated
by the federal government, and the system has been constantly
contested by the states, not less because the two main sources of
income: "revenue" and "value added" have been considered and
recognized as "federal." The states' primary source of income is
employee roll tax, hotel accommodation revenues, tenancy, and
use of motor vehicles. Real estate tax is directly granted by the
Constitution to the municipalities - as well as the free use of it.
The Federation assigns to the states and municipalities an av-
erage of eighty-five percent of their total income. Those monies
form the so-called General Participations Fund. Special participa-
tions are granted for specific purposes, according to certain per-
centages of distribution adapted to the size, population, and de-
gree of development of each state.
In the last few years, an effort has been made to balance the
distribution of the total revenue. The amount of federal money is
increasing, but the local sources of revenue continue to be very
limited and represent a very low percentage of each state budget.
The special participations have been benefiting from a constant
increase, but they are specifically allocated to concrete purposes
according the decisions of the federal powers without intervention
of the states. The federal criteria is that they form part of the na-
tional programs of development. But, the state criteria for the use
of resources are frequently different from the federal power's
standards. This situation occurs in a deficient national tax sys-
tem.
The total tax income in Mexico represents 17.5% of the GDP. In
Brazil it is 21.37%; Germany 26.96%; USA 28.96%; Switzerland
32.08%; Belgium 33.42%; Austria 33.47%; Australia 37.30%; and
Canada 39.07%. All of the countries mentioned are federal states.
Part of the explanation for this obvious retard is Mexico's exces-
sive dependence on the taxes paid by the state enterprise
Petr6leos Mexicanos (PEMEX) on its oil revenue. In the last
twenty five years, PEMEX paid in taxes an average 24% of the
total federal tax revenue. The use of these resources has resulted
in an inefficient system, aggravated by the political temptation of
avoiding the popularity cost of raising and collecting taxes. In the
new atmosphere of political competition, the problem has become
more serious.
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It is agreed that the design of the tax system is very deficient.
Aside from that fact, there are problems of tax evasion, a limited
base of taxpayers, ineffective administrative practices, and the
spectacular growth of an informal economy since the last decade of
the past century as a reaction to unemployment due to economic
crisis and insufficient growth.
CONAGO is discussing, with the federal government:
" The amount of resources granted to the states;
" The possible "redistribution" of certain charges;
* The freedom of administration of federal money
by the states;
* The necessary participation of the states in a
full revision of the national tax system; and
* A national system of "transparency" in the col-
lection of taxes and use of public money.
IX. A GENERAL VIEW OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN MEXICO
Today's federalism in Mexico is part of a general transition and
consolidation of a new democracy.
After almost forty years of absolute domination, the President-
Party system showed signs of declining authority at the end of the
1960s. This erosion resulted from the remarkable growth of an
educated middle class whose economic and social aims could no
longer be satisfied. The system of a closed economy with its em-
phasis on the internal market and the creation of an industrial
structure based on protectionism resulted in the inability to com-
pete in a new global economy. The consequences were low growth
rates, inflation, and unemployment. The excessive confidence in
oil income, the absence of a tax reform, and the mismanagement
of the economy provoked a series of crises: devaluations, increase
of prices of oil products and electricity, high rates of interest, and
so on. The necessary measures to revive the economy were very
painful for the middle class. The opposition was thus strength-
ened.
Various external factors led to strong pressures to liberalize not
only the economy but also the political system - the position of
Mexico in the world economy (the eleventh economy in gross do-
mestic product); its geographic situation (with 2000 kilometers of
border with the United States); the interest of foreign countries in
taking commercial advantage of Mexico's proximity to the largest
market in the world by establishing plants in Mexican territory
with lower production costs; and the prospective trade agreement
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between the United States and Mexico. Mexico's last presidents
were sensitive to these combined external pressures and became
conscious of the imminence of political reforms.
Mexico has a very poor democratic tradition. Four years follow-
ing the War of Independence from Spain; ten years following the
restoration of the republic, triumphant in wars against the con-
servatives, the Catholic Church and the French Intervention; and
only one year following the victory of the Revolution of 1910 ac-
count for the only democracy in almost two centuries of independ-
ent life. On the contrary, the authoritarian tradition is very
strong, with two centuries of Aztecs, three centuries of Spanish
absolutism, and one century in which the power was obtained with
rifles, not with votes, followed by the President-Party system
which ruled seventy years.
The longevity of the system can be explained by its pragmatism,
its openness to different social classes and to younger generations,
and the continuous search for legitimacy with rare use of coercion.
The embracement of different groups and levels of society was
summarized as "the revolutionary family." Inside the party, the
process of negotiation and assignment of power quotas was con-
tinuous and no information was revealed outside.
The changes began in different levels of society. They did not
have a common pattern and did not reflect a specific program: the
"intelligentia," the press, a Catholic Church now defending the
poor and not the privileged classes, environmental defendants,
human rights activists, independent labor and peasant organiza-
tions - all achieved recognition and not simple tolerance. Their
demands were taken seriously, especially those presented by In-
dian groups that were supported by the majority of the Mexican
society.
Politically, this non-conformism was revealed in municipal elec-
tions which were more and more difficult for the government to
control. By 1992, 44% of the population of municipalities and 30
of the 150 of the biggest cities' mayors were from the then-
opposition parties. It was an obvious grassroots movement. A
new generation of politicians, almost all of them successful busi-
nessman and professionals who were new members of PAN in dif-
ferent states, developed an activism which explains today's gover-
norship map.
All this was made possible by the constitutional reforms which
were previously discussed.
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The actual Mexican urban society is a new phenomenon. Until
recently, the country was predominantly rural, and the towns
were dominated by local elites. The new social shape was the re-
sult of the social and political changes which occurred in the first
decades of the century. The mestizo "mix blooded" is today's
Mexican; he was the big winner of the Revolution of 1910. But
society is divided between rich and poor, with a tremendous dif-
ference in the distribution of income. Those in the upper income
level - about 20% of the population - control almost 60% of the
total income in Mexico. The lower income level - also 20% of the
population - earn only 5% of the income. Forty percent of the
Mexican population - approximately forty million people - earn
less than what is identified by economists as the poverty line, a
level of income below which one cannot afford to purchases re-
sources necessary to live.
The Indians are still a society of ten million people living in
poverty; they are not integrated into mainstream society, but live
within traditional cultures.
These imbalances favor populist attitudes that could be danger-
ous. The menace of a plebiscitarian government is real. The ap-
peal to the pressure of the masses on the institutions is a possibil-
ity.
The big winners in the process have been the political parties
that monopolize elections and have the exclusive claim for reme-
dies against unconstitutional electoral laws. By constitutional
provision, they are provided by public funds.
But, if the political parties are financed with public resources,
questions arise regarding the use of that money, as well as about
illegal contributions. The constant criticism by each party of the
others' practices, an unwillingness to compromise or to seek long-
term solutions, and above all, the lack of democracy within the
respective party organizations has created an adverse public opin-
ion.
Important reforms are required: opening the national govern-
ment energy utilities to private and foreign investment, revision of
the deficient tax system, and the liberalization of the labor market
by making the labor laws more flexible. At the moment there is
an impasse because political parties in Congress have been unable
to discuss seriously with long term views any of the necessary re-
forms.
There is also an institutional issue. The Chamber of Represen-
tatives has 500 seats: 300 filled according to the principle of ma-
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jority, and 200 filled according to proportional representation.
Any of the three parties has the majority.
Mexico has not two, but three political parties. Ideologically,
the parties are located between the center-right and the moderate
left. It is fortunate that there are not extremes. With the actual
composition of Congress in which any of the parties constitutes a
majority, the President requires the consent of two of the three
political parties on main issues and the necessary majority for
constitutional reforms. Consensus is proving to be very difficult.
With three strong political parties, we can very easily foresee a
candidate winning the presidency with as little as 34% of the na-
tional vote, which would give him questionable legitimacy. (The
Mexican Constitution does not provide for a second round of voting
for the President.)
Due to its new responsibilities, the Supreme Court of Justice is
resolving, according to the Constitution, legal matters that involve
political conflicts. It has been doing remarkable work, but some-
times has been a target of irresponsible attacks from political par-
ties or members of Congress not favored by a given decision. The
same comment is true of the Electoral Court. The Federal Judi-
cial Power has been acting with full autonomy. The Supreme
Court of Justice has been a key factor in today's political equilib-
rium.
Many Mexicans have a cautious attitude regarding the state
courts and even a cynical approach to justice. Corruption and po-
litical influence in some of the state courts is unfortunately still
present. One cannot achieve democracy without a strong social
conscience and respect for the rule of law. Thus, the institutional
framework and the rule of law present weaknesses that must be
overcome if real democracy is to be consolidated.
On the positive side, as different opinion polls illustrate, the
overwhelming majority of today's Mexicans believe that democ-
racy is the best system of government and that it is the only way
for the country to achieve social and economic development. The
civil society is moving towards different forms of expression in so-
cial and cultural matters.
It is in this arena in which the new federalism is performing.
The creative forces of the provinces seem to emerge and demand a
fair allocation of powers. The results depend on the consolidation
of democracy; at the same time, the new federalist movement
could be one of the most important elements to achieve it.
Vol. 44
